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Abstract
Why did such highly abstract ideas as truth, knowledge, or justice become so
important to us? What was the point of coming to think in these terms? The
Practical Origins of Ideas presents a philosophical method designed to answer
such questions: the method of pragmatic genealogy. Pragmatic genealogies
are partly fictional, partly historical narratives exploring what might have
driven us to develop certain ideas in order to discover what these do for us.
The book uncovers an under-appreciated tradition of pragmatic genealogy
which cuts across the analytic-continental divide, running from the state-of-
nature stories of DavidHume and the early genealogies of FriedrichNietzsche
to recent work in analytic philosophy by Edward Craig, Bernard Williams,
and Miranda Fricker. However, these genealogies combine fictionalizing
and historicizing in ways that even philosophers sympathetic to the use of
state-of-nature fictions or real history have found puzzling. To make sense
of why both fictionalizing and historicizing are called for, the book offers a
systematic account of pragmatic genealogies as dynamic models serving to
reverse-engineer the points of ideas in relation not only to near-universal
human needs, but also to socio-historically situated needs. This allows the
method to offer us explanation without reduction and to help us understand
what led our ideas to shed the traces of their practical origins. Far from being
normatively inert, moreover, pragmatic genealogy can affect the space of
reasons, guiding attempts to improve our conceptual repertoire by helping us
determine whether and when our ideas are worth having.
Keywords:PhilosophicalMethodology,Conceptual Reverse-Engineering,Con-
ceptual Ethics, Genealogy, Cambridge Pragmatism, Naturalism, David Hume,
Friedrich Nietzsche, E. J. Craig, Bernard Williams, Miranda Fricker.
Our common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have
found worth drawing, and the connections they have found worth
making, in the lifetimes of many generations.
J . L. A￿￿￿￿￿
Concepts are neither true nor false, but they can be evaluated: do we
have reason to track the distinction drawn by the concept? Should we
have this or that concept in our repertoire at all?
S. H￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
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CHAPTER ONE
Why We Came to Think as We Do
We did not make the ideas we live by. They are, for the most part, ideas we
inherited, unthinkingly growing into patterns of thought cultivated by others,
with little sense of why just these ways of seeing, valuing, and reasoning
should have gained hold in the first place. Some ideas, like that of water, may
be so plainly useful for creatures like us as to appear inevitable. But many
of our most venerable ideas—such as truth, knowledge, or justice–are highly
abstract, and their practical value for us is elusive. Why did these ‘highest
concepts’, these ‘last wisps of smoke at the evaporating end of reality’ (TI,
Reason, §4), as Nietzsche called them, ever become so important to us? What
was the point of coming to think in these terms, and what would we lose if
we lacked them?
Such Pragmatic Questions about the practical origins of ideas have seldom
been raised. They have tended to be side-lined by more traditional Socratic
Questions of the form ‘What is X?’ Aiming straight at the essence of truth,
knowledge, or justice, the Socratic approach reckons that if only we achieve
clarity about what these things really are, an understanding of why we
came to be concerned with them will follow. Socratic Questions can prove
obstinately vexing, however, and a consensus on what truth, knowledge,
or justice are has yet to emerge. Accordingly, some have concluded with
the American pragmatist C. S. Peirce that ‘we must not begin by talking of
pure ideas—vagabond thoughts that tramp the public highways without any
human habitation—but must begin with men and their conversation’ (1931,
8.112). Peirce, like the philosophers I discuss in this book,diagnoseda tendency
2 • Why We Came to Think as We Do
in philosophy to set ideas too high above human affairs, to contemplate them
entirely in vacuo. Ideas are in their element in distinctive contexts of purposive
human action, action which takes place against a background of contingent
facts about us and the world we live in. Trying to understand the ideas we live
by in isolation from the circumstances in which they are felicitously deployed
is like studying a shoal of beached fish as if they were in their natural habitat.
Instead, we can turn the order of explanation around and let thewhat grow
out of the why: we approach the question of the nature of truth, knowledge,
or justice by first asking why we came to think in these terms. Such an inquiry
into the origins of ideas can take many guises. Plato asked after the origins of
ideas, but he sought them in an abstract realm of Forms. Conceptual historians
of various stripes asked after the origins of ideas, but they sought them by
tracing the changing meanings of words across different socio-historical
contexts. My concern, by contrast, is with the practical origins of ideas: with
the ways in which the ideas we live by can be shown to be rooted in practical
needs and concerns generated by certain facts about us and our situation.
If an idea persists, the reason may be that it fills a need. What motivates
this assumption is the realization that we are, as Jane Heal puts it, ‘finite
in our cognitive resources while the world is immensely rich in kinds of
feature and hence in the possibilities it offers for conceptualization’ (2013,
342). Why do we find at our disposal just the concepts we do rather than
any of the countless imaginable alternatives? As Heal goes on to remark, this
question cannot be answered simply by observing that using certain concepts
enables us to form true judgements in terms of those concepts. More needs to
be said—in particular, about what makes thinking and judging in just these
terms worthwhile. This is especially true of the abstract notions at the heart
of philosophy, which seem to be the stuff of idle grandiloquence rather than
effective action. What needs, if any, were filled by introducing these ideas into
our repertoire? What necessity was the mother of these inventions?
The method I propose to explore in this book is designed to help us look
at ideas from a practical point of view—took look at what ideas do rather
than at whether the judgments they figure in are true—in order to see how
exactly our ideas are bound up with our needs and concerns. This method,
which I propose to call pragmatic genealogy, consists in telling partly fictional,
partly historical narratives exploring what might have driven us to develop
certain ideas in order to discover what these ideas do for us. What point do
they serve? What is the useful difference these ideas make to the lives of those
who live by them? Much as an archeologist who digs up a mysterious relic
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will try to reverse-engineer its point by imaginatively reconstructing the life
of those who used it and hypothesizing what useful difference it might have
made to that life, we can take an abstract idea whose point eludes us, such as
truth, knowledge, or justice, and try to explain why we came to think in these
terms by reconstructing the practical problems that these ideas offer practical
solutions to. A pragmatic genealogy answers the question of why we came
to think as we do by reverse-engineering the points of ideas, tracing them to
their practical origins and revealing what they do for us when they function
well.
[end of preview]
